When Sovereigns Go Bankrupt (Record no. 51314)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03650nam a22004815i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-3-319-08988-1
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20200420211752.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 140814s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9783319089881
-- 978-3-319-08988-1
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 336
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author Gaillard, Norbert.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title When Sovereigns Go Bankrupt
Sub Title A Study on Sovereign Risk /
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XI, 70 p.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement SpringerBriefs in Economics,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 Introduction -- Identifying Sovereign Defaults -- Protecting against Sovereign Defaults -- Preventing Sovereign Defaults -- Anticipating Sovereign Debt Crises -- Conclusion.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc The public debt crisis that Eurozone countries have experienced since 2010 has been accompanied by a resurgence of sovereign risk. Greece was obliged to restructure its debt in 2012. The credit position of even the wealthy countries is shakier than at any time since the Great Depression. Now more than ever it is essential to understand sovereign risk because the default of a country, or even its lack of credibility, is bound to jeopardize political stability and weaken the credit standing of all other economic actors. This book reviews and analyzes the different means used to forestall and protect against sovereign defaults. In light of the Eurozone's 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis, this book also emphasizes the roots of sovereign creditworthiness. Chapter 1 establishes a typology of sovereign defaults. A sovereign "bankruptcy" may take many forms (debt repudiation, moratorium, restructuring, etc.). Chapter 2 presents the different contractual and legal tools used to protect against sovereign defaults. Chapter 3 investigates how some investors have been able to interfere with the debtor's economic policy by insisting that measures be taken to reduce the risk of default in the short and medium term. Such interference can be direct or may be more subtle. There is a specific focus on the conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund. Chapter 4 studies the various tools that investors can use to discriminate among borrowers and forecast debt crises (bond yields and spreads as well as ratings provided by Fitch, Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Euromoney Country Risk). Chapter 4 also demonstrates that sovereign debtors must overcome seven types of risk in order to preserve their creditworthiness: natural disaster, geopolitical risk, institutional and political risk, economic risk, monetary and exchange rate risk, fiscal and tax-system risk, and debt-related risk.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08988-1
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
264 #1 -
-- Cham :
-- Springer International Publishing :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2014.
336 ## -
-- text
-- txt
-- rdacontent
337 ## -
-- computer
-- c
-- rdamedia
338 ## -
-- online resource
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-- text file
-- PDF
-- rda
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Macroeconomics.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Public finance.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Economic policy.
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Economics.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Public Economics.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Economic Policy.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 2191-5504
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-- ZDB-2-SBE

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