Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory (Record no. 52373)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03171nam a22004935i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-3-319-13515-1
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20200420220229.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 141227s2015 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9783319135151
-- 978-3-319-13515-1
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 621.382
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author Stewin, Patrick.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Detecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XV, 108 p. 35 illus., 34 illus. in color.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 Introduction -- Technical Background, Preliminaries and Assumptions -- Related Work -- Study of a Stealthy, Direct Memory Access based Malicious Software -- A Primitive for Detecting DMA Malware -- Authentic Reporting to External Platforms -- Conclusions and Future Work.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This work addresses stealthy peripheral-based attacks on host computers and presents a new approach to detecting them. Peripherals can be regarded as separate systems that have a dedicated processor and dedicated runtime memory to handle their tasks. The book addresses the problem that peripherals generally communicate with the host via the host's main memory, storing cryptographic keys, passwords, opened files and other sensitive data in the process - an aspect attackers are quick to exploit.  Here, stealthy malicious software based on isolated micro-controllers is implemented to conduct an attack analysis, the results of which provide the basis for developing a novel runtime detector. The detector reveals stealthy peripheral-based attacks on the host's main memory by exploiting certain hardware properties, while a permanent and resource-efficient measurement strategy ensures that the detector is also capable of detecting transient attacks, which can otherwise succeed when the applied strategy only measures intermittently. Attackers exploit this strategy by attacking the system in between two measurements and erasing all traces of the attack before the system is measured again.  .
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13515-1
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
264 #1 -
-- Cham :
-- Springer International Publishing :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2015.
336 ## -
-- text
-- txt
-- rdacontent
337 ## -
-- computer
-- c
-- rdamedia
338 ## -
-- online resource
-- cr
-- rdacarrier
347 ## -
-- text file
-- PDF
-- rda
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Input-output equipment (Computers).
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Computer security.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Electrical engineering.
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Communications Engineering, Networks.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Input/Output and Data Communications.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Systems and Data Security.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 2192-2810
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-ENG

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