Fuzzy Social Choice Theory (Record no. 58424)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03721nam a22005655i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-3-319-05176-5
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20200421112543.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 140224s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9783319051765
-- 978-3-319-05176-5
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 006.3
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author B. Gibilisco, Michael.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Fuzzy Social Choice Theory
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XVIII, 185 p. 7 illus.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 Fuzzy Social Choice -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- Conclusion.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrow's theorem;  the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; and the median voter theorem.  After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences,  but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems,  this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 M. Gowen, Annie.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 E. Albert, Karen.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 N. Mordeson, John.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 J. Wierman, Mark.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 D. Clark, Terry.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
264 #1 -
-- Cham :
-- Springer International Publishing :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2014.
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-- computer
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-- rdamedia
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-- online resource
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-- text file
-- PDF
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650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Political theory.
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-- Mathematics.
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-- Social sciences.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Computational intelligence.
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Computational Intelligence.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Political Theory.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Mathematics in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 1434-9922 ;
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-- ZDB-2-ENG

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