On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions (Record no. 78598)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03472nam a22005655i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-3-319-75820-6
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20220801220451.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 180327s2019 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9783319758206
-- 978-3-319-75820-6
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 621.3815
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author Tajik, Shahin.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1st ed. 2019.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XX, 79 p. 36 illus., 24 illus. in color.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 Introduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
264 #1 -
-- Cham :
-- Springer International Publishing :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2019.
336 ## -
-- text
-- txt
-- rdacontent
337 ## -
-- computer
-- c
-- rdamedia
338 ## -
-- online resource
-- cr
-- rdacarrier
347 ## -
-- text file
-- PDF
-- rda
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Electronic circuits.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Security systems.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Microprogramming .
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Signal processing.
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Electronic Circuits and Systems.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Security Science and Technology.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Control Structures and Microprogramming.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Signal, Speech and Image Processing .
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 2192-2829
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-ENG
912 ## -
-- ZDB-2-SXE

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