Game Theory for Data Science (Record no. 85945)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03499nam a22005295i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-3-031-01577-9
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240730164843.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 220601s2017 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9783031015779
-- 978-3-031-01577-9
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 006.3
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author Faltings, Boi.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Game Theory for Data Science
Sub Title Eliciting Truthful Information /
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1st ed. 2017.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XV, 135 p.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Mechanisms for Verifiable Information -- Parametric Mechanisms for Unverifiable Information -- Nonparametric Mechanisms: Multiple Reports -- Nonparametric Mechanisms: Multiple Tasks -- Prediction Markets: Combining Elicitation and Aggregation -- Agents Motivated by Influence -- Decentralized Machine Learning -- Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Authors' Biographies .
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards. We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.
700 1# - AUTHOR 2
Author 2 Radanovic, Goran.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01577-9
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
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-- Cham :
-- Springer International Publishing :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2017.
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-- txt
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-- computer
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-- rdamedia
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-- online resource
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347 ## -
-- text file
-- PDF
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650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Artificial intelligence.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Machine learning.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Neural networks (Computer science) .
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Artificial Intelligence.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Machine Learning.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Mathematical Models of Cognitive Processes and Neural Networks.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 1939-4616
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-- ZDB-2-SXSC

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