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Timing Channels in Cryptography [electronic resource] : A Micro-Architectural Perspective / by Chester Rebeiro, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Sarani Bhattacharya.

By: Rebeiro, Chester [author.].
Contributor(s): Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep [author.] | Bhattacharya, Sarani [author.] | SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2015Description: XVII, 152 p. 75 illus., 14 illus. in color. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783319123707.Subject(s): Engineering | Data structures (Computer science) | Engineering | Signal, Image and Speech Processing | Data Structures, Cryptology and Information TheoryAdditional physical formats: Printed edition:: No titleDDC classification: 621.382 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
An Introduction to Timing Attacks -- Modern Cryptography -- Superscalar Processors, Cache Memories, and Branch Predictors -- Time-Driven Cache Attacks -- Advanced Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- A Formal Analysis of Time-Driven Cache Attacks -- Profiled Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- Access-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- Branch Prediction Attacks -- Countermeasures for Timing Attacks.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describes and analyzes various unintended covert timing channels that are formed when ciphers are executed in microprocessors. Modern superscalar microprocessors are considered, which are enabled with features such as multi-threaded, pipelined, parallel, speculative, and out-of-order execution. Various timing attack algorithms are described and analyzed for  block ciphers as well as public-key ciphers. The interplay between the cipher implementation, system architecture, and the attack's success is analyzed. Further hardware and software countermeasures are discussed with the aim of illustrating methods to build systems that can protect against these attacks. Discusses various timing attack algorithms in detail allowing readers to reconstruct the attack. Provides several experimental results to support the theoretical analysis provided in the book. Analyzes information leakage from cache memories and branch prediction units in the processor. Examines information leakage models that would help quantify leakage in a covert timing channels.
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An Introduction to Timing Attacks -- Modern Cryptography -- Superscalar Processors, Cache Memories, and Branch Predictors -- Time-Driven Cache Attacks -- Advanced Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- A Formal Analysis of Time-Driven Cache Attacks -- Profiled Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- Access-Driven Cache Attacks on Block Ciphers -- Branch Prediction Attacks -- Countermeasures for Timing Attacks.

This book deals with timing attacks on software implementations of encryption algorithms. It describes and analyzes various unintended covert timing channels that are formed when ciphers are executed in microprocessors. Modern superscalar microprocessors are considered, which are enabled with features such as multi-threaded, pipelined, parallel, speculative, and out-of-order execution. Various timing attack algorithms are described and analyzed for  block ciphers as well as public-key ciphers. The interplay between the cipher implementation, system architecture, and the attack's success is analyzed. Further hardware and software countermeasures are discussed with the aim of illustrating methods to build systems that can protect against these attacks. Discusses various timing attack algorithms in detail allowing readers to reconstruct the attack. Provides several experimental results to support the theoretical analysis provided in the book. Analyzes information leakage from cache memories and branch prediction units in the processor. Examines information leakage models that would help quantify leakage in a covert timing channels.

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