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A new swing-contract design for wholesale power markets / Leigh S. Tesfatsion.

By: Tesfatsion, Leigh [author.].
Contributor(s): IEEE Xplore (Online Service) [distributor.] | Wiley [publisher.].
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: IEEE press series on power engineering: Publisher: Hoboken, New Jersey : Wiley-IEEE Press, [2021]Distributor: [Piscataqay, New Jersey] : IEEE Xplore, [2020]Description: 1 PDF.Content type: text Media type: electronic Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9781119670131.Subject(s): Electric utilities | Electric utilities -- Costs | Options (Finance)Genre/Form: Electronic books.Additional physical formats: Print version:: A new swing-contract design for wholesale power marketsDDC classification: 333.793/23 Online resources: Abstract with links to resource Also available in print.
Contents:
1 Introduction 9 -- 2 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 15 -- 2.1 Chapter Preview 15 -- 2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 15 -- 2.3 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 16 -- 2.4 Stresses Faced by Current U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 19 -- 3 Motivation for Current Study 21 -- 3.1 Chapter Preview 21 -- 3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed -- Wholesale Power Markets 21 -- 3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 21 -- 3.2.2 Problematic Use of Hedonic Pricing 22 -- 3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 23 -- 3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 24 -- 3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 26 -- 3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 27 -- 3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 28 -- 3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 30 -- 3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 30 -- 4 Swing Contracts for ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 33 -- 4.1 Swing Contract Overview 33 -- 4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 33 -- 4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 35 -- 5 Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 37 -- 5.1 Chapter Preview 37 -- 5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 38 -- 5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 42 -- 3 -- 4 Contents -- 5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 43 -- 5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in -- Power and Ramp 48 -- 5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 50 -- 5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52 -- 6 Swing-Contract Market Design 55 -- 6.1 Chapter Preview 55 -- 6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55 -- 6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 57 -- 6.4 Reserve Bids 58 -- 6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 59 -- 6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60 -- 6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61.
7 Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case MILP Formulation 65 -- 7.1 Chapter Preview 65 -- 7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 66 -- 7.3 Discretization of the ISO's Optimization Problem 67 -- 7.4 ISO Objective Function 71 -- 7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 72 -- 7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 74 -- 7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 76 -- 7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 79 -- 8 Inclusion of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 83 -- 8.1 Chapter Preview 83 -- 8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 83 -- 8.3 MILP Tractable Form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 85 -- 9 Inclusion of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 91 -- 9.1 Chapter Preview 91 -- 9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 92 -- 9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 94 -- 9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 94 -- 9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 95 -- 9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 95 -- 9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 97 -- 9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 98 -- 10 The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 101 -- 10.1 Chapter Preview 101 -- 10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 102 -- 10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract Markets 105 -- 10.4 Swing-Contract Long-Term Forward Markets 106 -- 10.5 Swing-Contract Short-Term Forward Markets 107 -- Contents 5 -- 10.6 Swing-Contract Very Short-Term Forward Markets 109 -- 10.7 Swing-Contract Deployment in Real-Time Operations 110 -- 11 Illustration: Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract -- Markets 113 -- 11.1 Chapter Preview 113 -- 11.2 Hour-Ahead Market with Reserve Offers Consisting of -- Swing-Contract Portfolios 114 -- 11.3 SCED Solution for Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Market 117 -- 11.3.1 Overview 117 -- 11.3.2 Power Balance 117 -- 11.3.3 Coverage of the ISO's Uncertainty Set 119 -- 11.3.4 Constrained Minimization of Expected Cost 121 -- 11.4 Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Markets 121 -- 12 Standard Modeling of a Competitive Market 125.
12.1 Chapter Preview 125 -- 12.2 Key Definitions 125 -- 12.3 Standard Competitive Market Assumptions 126 -- 12.4 Law of One Price for Commodities 126 -- 12.5 Competitive Market: Basic Formulation 127 -- 12.6 Net Surplus Extraction 130 -- 12.7 Market Efficiency Metric 131 -- 12.8 Market Efficiency and Pricing Rules 133 -- 12.9 Strategic Trade Behavior and Trader Market Power 134 -- 13 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets: Efficiency and Market Power 137 -- 13.1 Chapter Preview 137 -- 13.2 Daily Market Operations 137 -- 13.3 Illustrative Analytical DAM Formulation 140 -- 13.4 Net Surplus Extraction in the Illustrative DAM 141 -- 13.5 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-I Error 145 -- 13.6 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-II Error 149 -- 13.7 Market Inefficiency in the Illustrative DAM. 153 -- 13.8 DAM Performance: General Assessment 156 -- 13.9 Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts 158 -- 14 Comparisons with Swing-Contract Markets 161 -- 14.1 Chapter Preview 161 -- 14.2 Product Definition in U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 162 -- 14.3 Wholesale Power and the Law of One Price (Not) 164 -- 14.4 Differential vs. Uniform Pricing 165 -- 14.5 Comparison of SC and Current U.S. DAM Designs 166 -- 6 Contents -- 15 Advantages of the Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 169 -- 15.1 Chapter Preview 169 -- 15.2 SC Markets are Physically-Covered Insurance Markets 170 -- 15.3 Longer-Term SC Markets Support New Investment 171 -- 15.4 SC Markets Ensure Revenue Sufficiency 176 -- 15.5 SC Markets Ameliorate Merit-Order Concerns 177 -- 15.6 SC Markets are Robust-Control Mechanisms 178 -- 15.7 SC Markets Reduce Rule Complexity 179 -- 15.8 SC Markets Reduce Gaming Opportunities 180 -- 15.9 SC Markets Have Smaller-Sized Optimizations 182 -- 15.10 Additional Advantages of SC Markets 183 -- 15.10.1 Ensure a Level Playing Field for Resource Participation 183 -- 15.10.2 Permit Co-Optimization of Diverse Reserve 184 -- 15.10.3 Appropriately Remunerate Diversity and Flexibility 184 -- 15.10.4 Encourage Accurate Forecasting and Dispatch Following 184.
15.10.5 Ensure Settlement Time-Consistency 184 -- 16 Gradual Transmission to Linked Swing-Contract Markets 185 -- 16.1 Chapter Preview 185 -- 16.2 A DAM Formulation Permitting Gradual Transition 187 -- 16.3 Cost Function Preliminaries for the Transitional DAM189 -- 16.4 MILP SCUC/SCED Optimization for the Transitional DAM 192 -- 17 Swing-Contract Support for Integrated Transmission and -- Distribution Systems 201 -- 17.1 Chapter Preview 201 -- 17.2 Transactive Energy System Design for ITD Systems 203 -- 17.3 Role of Distribution Utilities 207 -- 17.4 An IDSO-Managed Bid-Based TES Design for Households 208 -- 17.5 IDSOs as Grid-Edge Resource Aggregators 211 -- 17.6 Swing-Contract Support for IDSO Participation in Wholesale -- Power Markets 212 -- 18 Design Evaluation via the ITD TES Platform 213 -- 18.1 Chapter Preview 213 -- 18.2 Design Readiness Levels 213 -- 18.3 An ITD TES Platform Permitting TES Design Evaluation 216 -- 18.4 Illustrative Test Cases: Overview218 -- 18.5 Illustrative Test Cases: Report 221 -- 19 Potential Future Research Directions 227 -- 20 Conclusion: The Dots Keep Connecting 231 -- Contents 7 -- 21 Appendices 233 -- 21.1 Quick-Reference Glossary of Standard Acronyms 233 -- 21.2 Quick-Reference Glossary of Transmission System Terms 234 -- 21.3 Quick-Reference Glossary of Economic Terms 235 -- 21.4 Nomenclature for a Swing-Contract Market 236 -- 21.5 Nomenclature for a Distribution System 238 -- References 239.
Summary: "Growing reliance on variable energy resources and greater encouragement of demand-side participation have led to greater volatility and uncertainty in real-time net load (i.e., electric power usage net of non-dispatchable generation). This, in turn, has led to a greater need for the flexible provision of reserve (dispatchable power paths) to ensure net load can be balanced in real-time operations, an essential requirement for reliable transmission grid operations. This greater need for flexible reserve provision has been difficult for current wholesale electric power markets to meet, given the rigidities and conceptual problems inherent in their design."-- Provided by publisher.
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Includes index.

1 Introduction 9 -- 2 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets: Overview 15 -- 2.1 Chapter Preview 15 -- 2.2 General Goals for Wholesale Power Market Design 15 -- 2.3 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Market Operations 16 -- 2.4 Stresses Faced by Current U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 19 -- 3 Motivation for Current Study 21 -- 3.1 Chapter Preview 21 -- 3.2 Problematic Design Aspects of U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed -- Wholesale Power Markets 21 -- 3.2.1 Artificial Distinction Between Energy and Reserve 21 -- 3.2.2 Problematic Use of Hedonic Pricing 22 -- 3.2.3 Revenue Insufficiency and Incentive Problems 23 -- 3.2.4 Computational Fragility of LMP Derivations 24 -- 3.2.5 Performance Payment in Advance of Performance Delivery 26 -- 3.2.6 Minimal Direct Representation of Retail Customer Interests 27 -- 3.2.7 Reliance on Overly Simplistic Cost Conceptions 28 -- 3.2.8 Use of Spot-Market Pricing for Forward Markets 30 -- 3.3 Relation of Current Study to Previous Swing-Contract Work 30 -- 4 Swing Contracts for ISO-Managed Wholesale Power Markets 33 -- 4.1 Swing Contract Overview 33 -- 4.2 Swing Contracts: General Formulation 33 -- 4.3 Swing Contracts in Firm or Option Form 35 -- 5 Illustrative Swing-Contract Reserve Offers 37 -- 5.1 Chapter Preview 37 -- 5.2 A Simple Energy-Block Swing Contract in Firm Form 38 -- 5.3 An Energy-Block Swing Contract in Option Form 42 -- 3 -- 4 Contents -- 5.4 Swing-Contract Implementation of Standard Supply Offers 43 -- 5.5 A Swing Contract Offering Continuous Swing (Flexibility) in -- Power and Ramp 48 -- 5.6 A Swing Contract Offering Battery Services 50 -- 5.7 Swing-Contract Facilitation of Private Bilateral Contracting 52 -- 6 Swing-Contract Market Design 55 -- 6.1 Chapter Preview 55 -- 6.2 General Swing-Contract Market Formulation 55 -- 6.3 Financial and Physical Feasibility of Swing-Contract Offers 57 -- 6.4 Reserve Bids 58 -- 6.5 Handling of Fixed Reserve Bids and Non-Dispatched Power 59 -- 6.6 Performance Penalties and Incentives 60 -- 6.7 ISO Cost Allocation 61.

7 Swing-Contract Market Optimization: Base-Case MILP Formulation 65 -- 7.1 Chapter Preview 65 -- 7.2 General Assumptions and Notation 66 -- 7.3 Discretization of the ISO's Optimization Problem 67 -- 7.4 ISO Objective Function 71 -- 7.5 Complete Analytical MILP Formulation 72 -- 7.6 Additional Discussion of Optimization Aspects 74 -- 7.7 Five-Bus Test Case 76 -- 7.8 Thirty Bus Test Case with Adaptive Reserve Zones 79 -- 8 Inclusion of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 83 -- 8.1 Chapter Preview 83 -- 8.2 Cost Function Preliminaries 83 -- 8.3 MILP Tractable Form of Reserve Offers with Price Swing 85 -- 9 Inclusion of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 91 -- 9.1 Chapter Preview 91 -- 9.2 Incorporation of Benefits 92 -- 9.3 Modeling of Price-Sensitive Reserve Bids 94 -- 9.3.1 Standard Demand Function Formulation 94 -- 9.3.2 Reserve Bids with Time-of-Use Pricing 95 -- 9.3.3 Reserve Bids with Price Swing 95 -- 9.3.4 Reserve Bids Directly Expressed as Benefit Functions 97 -- 9.4 MILP Tractable Approximation of Benefit Functions 98 -- 10 The Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 101 -- 10.1 Chapter Preview 101 -- 10.2 Multistage Optimization and Time Inconsistency 102 -- 10.3 Settlement Time-Consistency of Swing-Contract Markets 105 -- 10.4 Swing-Contract Long-Term Forward Markets 106 -- 10.5 Swing-Contract Short-Term Forward Markets 107 -- Contents 5 -- 10.6 Swing-Contract Very Short-Term Forward Markets 109 -- 10.7 Swing-Contract Deployment in Real-Time Operations 110 -- 11 Illustration: Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract -- Markets 113 -- 11.1 Chapter Preview 113 -- 11.2 Hour-Ahead Market with Reserve Offers Consisting of -- Swing-Contract Portfolios 114 -- 11.3 SCED Solution for Hour-Ahead Swing-Contract Market 117 -- 11.3.1 Overview 117 -- 11.3.2 Power Balance 117 -- 11.3.3 Coverage of the ISO's Uncertainty Set 119 -- 11.3.4 Constrained Minimization of Expected Cost 121 -- 11.4 Linked Day-Ahead and Hour-Ahead Markets 121 -- 12 Standard Modeling of a Competitive Market 125.

12.1 Chapter Preview 125 -- 12.2 Key Definitions 125 -- 12.3 Standard Competitive Market Assumptions 126 -- 12.4 Law of One Price for Commodities 126 -- 12.5 Competitive Market: Basic Formulation 127 -- 12.6 Net Surplus Extraction 130 -- 12.7 Market Efficiency Metric 131 -- 12.8 Market Efficiency and Pricing Rules 133 -- 12.9 Strategic Trade Behavior and Trader Market Power 134 -- 13 U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets: Efficiency and Market Power 137 -- 13.1 Chapter Preview 137 -- 13.2 Daily Market Operations 137 -- 13.3 Illustrative Analytical DAM Formulation 140 -- 13.4 Net Surplus Extraction in the Illustrative DAM 141 -- 13.5 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-I Error 145 -- 13.6 Market Power in the Illustrative DAM: Type-II Error 149 -- 13.7 Market Inefficiency in the Illustrative DAM. 153 -- 13.8 DAM Performance: General Assessment 156 -- 13.9 Scheduling of Bilateral Contracts 158 -- 14 Comparisons with Swing-Contract Markets 161 -- 14.1 Chapter Preview 161 -- 14.2 Product Definition in U.S. RTO/ISO-Managed Markets 162 -- 14.3 Wholesale Power and the Law of One Price (Not) 164 -- 14.4 Differential vs. Uniform Pricing 165 -- 14.5 Comparison of SC and Current U.S. DAM Designs 166 -- 6 Contents -- 15 Advantages of the Linked Swing-Contract Market Design 169 -- 15.1 Chapter Preview 169 -- 15.2 SC Markets are Physically-Covered Insurance Markets 170 -- 15.3 Longer-Term SC Markets Support New Investment 171 -- 15.4 SC Markets Ensure Revenue Sufficiency 176 -- 15.5 SC Markets Ameliorate Merit-Order Concerns 177 -- 15.6 SC Markets are Robust-Control Mechanisms 178 -- 15.7 SC Markets Reduce Rule Complexity 179 -- 15.8 SC Markets Reduce Gaming Opportunities 180 -- 15.9 SC Markets Have Smaller-Sized Optimizations 182 -- 15.10 Additional Advantages of SC Markets 183 -- 15.10.1 Ensure a Level Playing Field for Resource Participation 183 -- 15.10.2 Permit Co-Optimization of Diverse Reserve 184 -- 15.10.3 Appropriately Remunerate Diversity and Flexibility 184 -- 15.10.4 Encourage Accurate Forecasting and Dispatch Following 184.

15.10.5 Ensure Settlement Time-Consistency 184 -- 16 Gradual Transmission to Linked Swing-Contract Markets 185 -- 16.1 Chapter Preview 185 -- 16.2 A DAM Formulation Permitting Gradual Transition 187 -- 16.3 Cost Function Preliminaries for the Transitional DAM189 -- 16.4 MILP SCUC/SCED Optimization for the Transitional DAM 192 -- 17 Swing-Contract Support for Integrated Transmission and -- Distribution Systems 201 -- 17.1 Chapter Preview 201 -- 17.2 Transactive Energy System Design for ITD Systems 203 -- 17.3 Role of Distribution Utilities 207 -- 17.4 An IDSO-Managed Bid-Based TES Design for Households 208 -- 17.5 IDSOs as Grid-Edge Resource Aggregators 211 -- 17.6 Swing-Contract Support for IDSO Participation in Wholesale -- Power Markets 212 -- 18 Design Evaluation via the ITD TES Platform 213 -- 18.1 Chapter Preview 213 -- 18.2 Design Readiness Levels 213 -- 18.3 An ITD TES Platform Permitting TES Design Evaluation 216 -- 18.4 Illustrative Test Cases: Overview218 -- 18.5 Illustrative Test Cases: Report 221 -- 19 Potential Future Research Directions 227 -- 20 Conclusion: The Dots Keep Connecting 231 -- Contents 7 -- 21 Appendices 233 -- 21.1 Quick-Reference Glossary of Standard Acronyms 233 -- 21.2 Quick-Reference Glossary of Transmission System Terms 234 -- 21.3 Quick-Reference Glossary of Economic Terms 235 -- 21.4 Nomenclature for a Swing-Contract Market 236 -- 21.5 Nomenclature for a Distribution System 238 -- References 239.

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"Growing reliance on variable energy resources and greater encouragement of demand-side participation have led to greater volatility and uncertainty in real-time net load (i.e., electric power usage net of non-dispatchable generation). This, in turn, has led to a greater need for the flexible provision of reserve (dispatchable power paths) to ensure net load can be balanced in real-time operations, an essential requirement for reliable transmission grid operations. This greater need for flexible reserve provision has been difficult for current wholesale electric power markets to meet, given the rigidities and conceptual problems inherent in their design."-- Provided by publisher.

Also available in print.

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