Algorithmic Game Theory  Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings /  [electronic resource] : 
edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis. 
 - 1st ed. 2010. 
 - VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.  online resource. 
 - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,  6386  2946-1642 ; .
 - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,  6386 .
<br/><br/>When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9783642161704 
<br/><br/><label>Standard No.: </label>10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4  doi 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Computer simulation.<br/>Electronic commerce.<br/>Computer science.<br/>Computers and civilization.<br/>Numerical analysis.<br/>Computer Modelling.<br/>e-Commerce and e-Business.<br/>Theory of Computation.<br/>Models of Computation.<br/>Computers and Society.<br/>Numerical Analysis.
<br/><br/><label>LC Class. No.: </label>QA76.9.C65 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>003.3