Internet and Network Economics  Third International Workshop,WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings /  [electronic resource] : 
edited by Xiaotie Deng, Fan Chung Graham. 
 - 1st ed. 2007. 
 - XVI, 600 p.  online resource. 
 - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,  4858  2946-1642 ; .
 - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,  4858 .
<br/><br/>WINE 2007 -- Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its History -- My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its Applications -- Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm -- The Computation of Equilibria -- A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex Optimization -- New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games -- A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided Markets -- An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash Equilibria -- Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games -- Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets -- Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and Performance -- Information Sharing Communities -- Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions -- Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions -- Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising -- Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search -- Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions -- Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction -- Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion Games -- Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics -- Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets? -- On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability Problems -- Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities -- Mechanism Design I -- False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team -- Mechanism Design on Trust Networks -- Stochastic Mechanism Design -- A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks -- A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests -- A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below Cost -- PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution -- Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks -- Advertisement Pricing I -- Sponsored Search with Contexts -- Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword Auctions -- Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions -- Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids -- An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ?-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget -- Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences -- Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities -- Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets -- Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes -- On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets -- Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games -- The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games -- Secure Relative Performance Scheme -- Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization Problem -- The Wi-Fi Roaming Game -- On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion Games -- The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked Pairs -- A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle Game -- Group Dominant Strategies -- Weighted Boolean Formula Games -- Core Stability of Vertex Cover Games -- Mechanism Design II -- Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions -- Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal Problems -- To Be or Not to Be (Served) -- Advertisement Pricing II -- Ad Auction Design and User Experience -- Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm -- Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search -- Pay-per-action Model for Online Advertising -- Public Advertisement Broker Markets -- Mechanism Design III -- K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation -- Monotone Properties ofRandomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions -- Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search -- On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions -- Characterizing Truthful Market Design. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9783540771050 
<br/><br/><label>Standard No.: </label>10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0  doi 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Computer networks .<br/>Computer science.<br/>Application software.<br/>Computers and civilization.<br/>Information technology--Management.<br/>Electronic commerce.<br/>Computer Communication Networks.<br/>Computer Science.<br/>Computer and Information Systems Applications.<br/>Computers and Society.<br/>Computer Application in Administrative Data Processing.<br/>e-Commerce and e-Business.
<br/><br/><label>LC Class. No.: </label>TK5105.5-5105.9 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>004.6