000 | 04131nam a22005895i 4500 | ||
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001 | 978-3-662-43975-3 | ||
003 | DE-He213 | ||
005 | 20200420211746.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 140801s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9783662439753 _9978-3-662-43975-3 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-662-43975-3 _2doi |
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050 | 4 | _aHB73 | |
072 | 7 |
_aLBBM _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aLNC _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aLAW014000 _2bisacsh |
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082 | 0 | 4 |
_a330 _223 |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPublic and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe _h[electronic resource] : _bLegal and Economic Perspectives / _cedited by Kai H�uschelrath, Heike Schweitzer. |
264 | 1 |
_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2014. |
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300 |
_aVI, 279 p. 19 illus. _bonline resource. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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490 | 1 |
_aZEW Economic Studies, _x1615-6781 ; _v48 |
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505 | 0 | _aPublic and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe - Introduction and Overview -- Public Enforcement of Anti-Cartel Laws - Theory and Empirical Evidence -- Leniency Programmes and the Structure of Cartels - Remarks from an Economic Perspective -- The Role of Fines in the Public Enforcement of Competition Law -- The Interaction of Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement - The Calculation of Fines and Damages -- The Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement - The Calculation and Reconciliation of Fines and Damages in Europe and Germany -- Disgorgement and Private Enforcement as Mitigating Circumstances for the Determination of Fines in Antitrust Law -- Quantifying Antitrust Damages - Economics and the Law -- Best Practices for Expert Economic Opinions - Key Element of Forensic Economics in Competition Law -- Access to Evidence and Presumptions - Communicating Vessels in Procedural Law -- Economic Evidence in Competition Litigation in Germany -- Private Damage Claims - Recent Developments in the Passing-on Defence -- Competition Law Enforcement in England and Wales. | |
520 | _aOver the past fifteen years, the optimal enforcement of EU competition law has become a major concern. This book contains a unique collection of articles by lawyers and economists on current issues in the public and private enforcement of competition law. Public enforcement has been strengthened in numerous ways - for example, through the introduction of a leniency programme and a substantial increase in fines for competition law violations. At the same time the EU Commission has been promoting private enforcement - for example, by developing a legal framework that grants victims of EU antitrust law infringements access to compensation. The contributions in this book address a range of topics in the area of competition law enforcement, including the role of fines and leniency programmes in public enforcement; access to evidence and the quantification of damages in private enforcement; and the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law in Europe. >. | ||
650 | 0 | _aPrivate international law. | |
650 | 0 | _aConflict of laws. | |
650 | 0 | _aInternational law. | |
650 | 0 | _aComparative law. | |
650 | 0 | _aTrade. | |
650 | 0 | _aIndustrial organization. | |
650 | 0 | _aEuropean Economic Community literature. | |
650 | 0 | _aLaw and economics. | |
650 | 1 | 4 | _aEconomics. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aLaw and Economics. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aInternational Economic Law, Trade Law. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aIndustrial Organization. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aPrivate International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aEuropean Integration. |
700 | 1 |
_aH�uschelrath, Kai. _eeditor. |
|
700 | 1 |
_aSchweitzer, Heike. _eeditor. |
|
710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783662439746 |
830 | 0 |
_aZEW Economic Studies, _x1615-6781 ; _v48 |
|
856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43975-3 |
912 | _aZDB-2-SBE | ||
942 | _cEBK | ||
999 |
_c50972 _d50972 |