000 03171nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-3-319-13515-1
003 DE-He213
005 20200420220229.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 141227s2015 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783319135151
_9978-3-319-13515-1
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-13515-1
_2doi
050 4 _aTK1-9971
072 7 _aTJK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aTEC041000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a621.382
_223
100 1 _aStewin, Patrick.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aDetecting Peripheral-based Attacks on the Host Memory
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Patrick Stewin.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2015.
300 _aXV, 108 p. 35 illus., 34 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services,
_x2192-2810
505 0 _aIntroduction -- Technical Background, Preliminaries and Assumptions -- Related Work -- Study of a Stealthy, Direct Memory Access based Malicious Software -- A Primitive for Detecting DMA Malware -- Authentic Reporting to External Platforms -- Conclusions and Future Work.
520 _aThis work addresses stealthy peripheral-based attacks on host computers and presents a new approach to detecting them. Peripherals can be regarded as separate systems that have a dedicated processor and dedicated runtime memory to handle their tasks. The book addresses the problem that peripherals generally communicate with the host via the host's main memory, storing cryptographic keys, passwords, opened files and other sensitive data in the process - an aspect attackers are quick to exploit.  Here, stealthy malicious software based on isolated micro-controllers is implemented to conduct an attack analysis, the results of which provide the basis for developing a novel runtime detector. The detector reveals stealthy peripheral-based attacks on the host's main memory by exploiting certain hardware properties, while a permanent and resource-efficient measurement strategy ensures that the detector is also capable of detecting transient attacks, which can otherwise succeed when the applied strategy only measures intermittently. Attackers exploit this strategy by attacking the system in between two measurements and erasing all traces of the attack before the system is measured again.  .
650 0 _aEngineering.
650 0 _aInput-output equipment (Computers).
650 0 _aComputer security.
650 0 _aElectrical engineering.
650 1 4 _aEngineering.
650 2 4 _aCommunications Engineering, Networks.
650 2 4 _aInput/Output and Data Communications.
650 2 4 _aSystems and Data Security.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319135144
830 0 _aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services,
_x2192-2810
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13515-1
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _cEBK
999 _c52373
_d52373