000 03788nam a22005655i 4500
001 978-3-319-13009-5
003 DE-He213
005 20200421111843.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 141231s2015 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783319130095
_9978-3-319-13009-5
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5
_2doi
050 4 _aTA169.7
050 4 _aT55-T55.3
050 4 _aTA403.6
072 7 _aTGPR
_2bicssc
072 7 _aTEC032000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a658.56
_223
245 1 0 _aGame Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security
_h[electronic resource] :
_bNetworks, Air Traffic and Emergency Departments /
_cedited by Kjell Hausken, Jun Zhuang.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2015.
300 _aXIV, 310 p. 84 illus., 28 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringer Series in Reliability Engineering,
_x1614-7839
520 _aMaximizing reader insights into the roles of intelligent agents in networks, air traffic and emergency departments, this volume focuses on congestion in systems where safety and security are at stake, devoting special attention to applying game theoretic analysis of congestion to: protocols in wired and wireless networks; power generation, air transportation and emergency department overcrowding. Reviewing exhaustively the key recent research into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding, and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between the different research approaches and serves to lay the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analyzing systems where congestion occurs - which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways - this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security. Addressing the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and others may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats. This game-theoretic analysis sets this two volume book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the work will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.
650 0 _aEngineering.
650 0 _aComputer security.
650 0 _aGame theory.
650 0 _aComplexity, Computational.
650 0 _aQuality control.
650 0 _aReliability.
650 0 _aIndustrial safety.
650 1 4 _aEngineering.
650 2 4 _aQuality Control, Reliability, Safety and Risk.
650 2 4 _aSystems and Data Security.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
650 2 4 _aComplexity.
700 1 _aHausken, Kjell.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aZhuang, Jun.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319130088
830 0 _aSpringer Series in Reliability Engineering,
_x1614-7839
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _cEBK
999 _c55674
_d55674