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001 978-3-319-05176-5
003 DE-He213
005 20200421112543.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 140224s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783319051765
_9978-3-319-05176-5
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5
_2doi
050 4 _aQ342
072 7 _aUYQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM004000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a006.3
_223
100 1 _aB. Gibilisco, Michael.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aFuzzy Social Choice Theory
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Michael B. Gibilisco, Annie M. Gowen, Karen E. Albert, John N. Mordeson, Mark J. Wierman, Terry D. Clark.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2014.
300 _aXVIII, 185 p. 7 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing,
_x1434-9922 ;
_v315
505 0 _aFuzzy Social Choice -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- Conclusion.
520 _aThis book offers a comprehensive analysis of the social choice literature and shows, by applying fuzzy sets, how the use of fuzzy preferences, rather than that of strict ones, may affect the social choice theorems. To do this, the book explores the presupposition of rationality within the fuzzy framework and shows that the two conditions for rationality, completeness and transitivity, do exist with fuzzy preferences. Specifically, this book examines: the conditions under which a maximal set exists; the Arrow's theorem;  the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; and the median voter theorem.  After showing that a non-empty maximal set does exists for fuzzy preference relations, this book goes on to demonstrating the existence of a fuzzy aggregation rule satisfying all five Arrowian conditions, including non-dictatorship. While the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem only considers individual fuzzy preferences, this work shows that both individuals and groups can choose alternatives to various degrees, resulting in a social choice that can be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial. Moreover, the median voter theorem is shown to hold under strict fuzzy preferences,  but not under weak fuzzy preferences. By providing a standard model of fuzzy social choice and by drawing the necessary connections between the major theorems,  this book fills an important gap in the current literature and encourages future empirical research in the field.
650 0 _aEngineering.
650 0 _aPolitical theory.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 0 _aSocial sciences.
650 0 _aComputational intelligence.
650 1 4 _aEngineering.
650 2 4 _aComputational Intelligence.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Theory.
650 2 4 _aMathematics in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
700 1 _aM. Gowen, Annie.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aE. Albert, Karen.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aN. Mordeson, John.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aJ. Wierman, Mark.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aD. Clark, Terry.
_eauthor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319051758
830 0 _aStudies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing,
_x1434-9922 ;
_v315
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
942 _cEBK
999 _c58424
_d58424