000 04285nam a2200625 i 4500
001 6642238
003 IEEE
005 20220712204814.0
006 m o d
007 cr |n|||||||||
008 151223s2013 mau ob 001 eng d
020 _z9780262019446
_qprint
020 _a9780262316538
_qelectronic
020 _z9781461939016
_qelectronic
020 _z1461939011
_qelectronic
020 _z0262316536
_qelectronic
035 _a(CaBNVSL)mat06642238
035 _a(IDAMS)0b00006481f1a637
040 _aCaBNVSL
_beng
_erda
_cCaBNVSL
_dCaBNVSL
043 _an-us---
050 4 _aUA22
_b.S57 2013eb
082 0 4 _a358.1/740973
_223
100 1 _aSlayton, Rebecca,
_d1974-
_924122
245 1 0 _aArguments that count :
_bphysics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012 /
_cRebecca Slayton.
264 1 _aCambridge, Massachusetts :
_bMIT Press,
_c[2013]
264 2 _a[Piscataqay, New Jersey] :
_bIEEE Xplore,
_c[2013]
300 _a1 PDF (pages cm.).
336 _atext
_2rdacontent
337 _aelectronic
_2isbdmedia
338 _aonline resource
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aInside technology
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
506 1 _aRestricted to subscribers or individual electronic text purchasers.
520 _aIn a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks.
530 _aAlso available in print.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web
588 _aDescription based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015.
650 0 _aNational security
_zUnited States
_xHistory
_y20th century.
_924123
650 0 _aNational security
_zUnited States
_xHistory
_y21st century.
_924124
650 0 _aBallistic missile defenses
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924125
650 0 _aPhysicists
_xPolitical activity
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924126
650 0 _aComputer scientists
_xPolitical activity
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924127
650 0 _aPhysics
_xPolitical aspects
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924128
650 0 _aComputer science
_xPolitical aspects
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924129
650 0 _aTechnological complexity
_xPolitical aspects
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924130
650 0 _aSoftware engineering
_xPolitical aspects
_zUnited States
_xHistory.
_924131
651 0 _aUnited States
_xMilitary policy.
_924132
655 0 _aElectronic books.
_93294
710 2 _aIEEE Xplore (Online Service),
_edistributor.
_924133
710 2 _aMIT Press,
_epublisher.
_924134
776 0 8 _iPrint version
_z9780262019446
830 0 _aInside technology
_921703
856 4 2 _3Abstract with links to resource
_uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/bkabstractplus.jsp?bkn=6642238
942 _cEBK
999 _c73338
_d73338