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245 1 0 _aSynthetic Biology 2020: Frontiers in Risk Analysis and Governance
_h[electronic resource] /
_cedited by Benjamin D. Trump, Christopher L. Cummings, Jennifer Kuzma, Igor Linkov.
250 _a1st ed. 2020.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2020.
300 _aXXV, 421 p. 55 illus., 37 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
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347 _atext file
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490 1 _aRisk, Systems and Decisions,
_x2626-6725
505 0 _aPreface -- Introduction to Synthetic Biology Risk Governance and Practice -- Section 1: Communities of Practice -- 2: History of Synthetic Biology Research and Scientific Practice -- 3: DIY Community, Biosafety, and Codes of Conduct -- 4: SynBio Research Labs in the Army Corps of Engineers -- Section 2: Examples of Scientific Practice -- 5: Research and Applications of Gene Drive Technology -- 6: Synthetic Biology, Digital Technologies, and Biohacking -- 7: Synthetic Biology experimental research – biomimicry -- 8: Biosafety Research for SynBio Applications in USACE Labs -- Section 3: Risk Analysis Tools -- 9: Applications of Bayesian Networks to identify SB research needs and uncertainties -- 10: Societal Risk Evaluation Scheme: Early Screening and Prioritizing for Anticipatory Risk Governance -- 11: Synbio – decision tools to drive governance and decision making -- 12: Challenges of SynBio Risk Management in LCA and other fields -- 13: Methods for Predicting Exposures to Products and Byproducts of Synthetic Biology -- 14: Solution-focused risk assessment for synthetic biology applications -- Section 4: Regulation and Governance -- 15: Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Variations for SynBio - Applications of Risk Culture -- 16: Adaptive & Anticipatory Governance -- 17: Synbio Regulatory lag and pacing problems -- 18: Synthetic biology governance via existing and prospective legal instruments (tentative) -- Section 5: Risk Communication and Engagement -- 19: Risk Communication, Gene Drives, and the Zika Virus -- 20: Engagement with publics under uncertainty -- 21: Inclusion and Public Engagement in Synthetic Biology: A component of Responsible Innovation -- 22: Biotethical Implications of Synthetic Biology and Emerging -- 23: Discussion/Conclusion.
520 _aSynthetic biology offers powerful remedies for some of the world’s most intractable problems, but these solutions are clouded by uncertainty and risk that few strategies are available to address. The incentives for continued development of this emerging technology are prodigious and obvious, and the public deserves assurances that all potential downsides are duly considered and minimized accordingly. Incorporating social science analysis within the innovation process may impose constraints, but its simultaneous support in making the end products more acceptable to society at large should be considered a worthy trade-off. Contributing authors in this volume represent diverse perspectives related to synthetic biology’s social sciences, and reflect on different areas of risk analysis and governance that have developed for the field. Such perspectives include leading scholarly discussion pertaining to risk assessment, governance, ethics, and communication. The chapters of this volume note that while the first twenty years of synthetic biology development have focused strongly on technological innovation and product development, the next twenty should emphasize the synergy between developers, policymakers, and publics to generate the most beneficial, well governed, and transparent technologies and products possible. Many chapters in this volume provide new data and approaches that demonstrate the feasibility for multi-stakeholder efforts involving policymakers, regulators, industrial developers, workers, experts, and societal representatives to share responsibilities in the production of effective and acceptable governance in the face of uncertain risk probabilities. A full consideration of such perspectives may prevent a world of draconian regulations based on an insufficient or incomplete understanding of the science that underpins synthetic biology, as well as any hesitancy or fear by the public to adopt its eventual products.
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650 1 4 _aSecurity Science and Technology.
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650 2 4 _aBiotechnology.
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650 2 4 _aChemical Bioengineering.
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700 1 _aTrump, Benjamin D.
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700 1 _aCummings, Christopher L.
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700 1 _aKuzma, Jennifer.
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700 1 _aLinkov, Igor.
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830 0 _aRisk, Systems and Decisions,
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