| 000 | 03472nam a22005655i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 978-3-319-75820-6 | ||
| 003 | DE-He213 | ||
| 005 | 20220801220451.0 | ||
| 007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
| 008 | 180327s2019 sz | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9783319758206 _9978-3-319-75820-6 |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6 _2doi |
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| 050 | 4 | _aTK7867-7867.5 | |
| 072 | 7 |
_aTJFC _2bicssc |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aTEC008010 _2bisacsh |
|
| 072 | 7 |
_aTJFC _2thema |
|
| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a621.3815 _223 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aTajik, Shahin. _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _950471 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aOn the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions _h[electronic resource] / _cby Shahin Tajik. |
| 250 | _a1st ed. 2019. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_aCham : _bSpringer International Publishing : _bImprint: Springer, _c2019. |
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| 300 |
_aXX, 79 p. 36 illus., 24 illus. in color. _bonline resource. |
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| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
||
| 490 | 1 |
_aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services, _x2192-2829 |
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| 505 | 0 | _aIntroduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion. | |
| 520 | _aThis book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts. | ||
| 650 | 0 |
_aElectronic circuits. _919581 |
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| 650 | 0 |
_aSecurity systems. _931879 |
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| 650 | 0 |
_aMicroprogramming . _932081 |
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| 650 | 0 |
_aSignal processing. _94052 |
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| 650 | 1 | 4 |
_aElectronic Circuits and Systems. _950472 |
| 650 | 2 | 4 |
_aSecurity Science and Technology. _931884 |
| 650 | 2 | 4 |
_aControl Structures and Microprogramming. _932083 |
| 650 | 2 | 4 |
_aSignal, Speech and Image Processing . _931566 |
| 710 | 2 |
_aSpringerLink (Online service) _950473 |
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| 773 | 0 | _tSpringer Nature eBook | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783319758190 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783319758213 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783030093334 |
| 830 | 0 |
_aT-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services, _x2192-2829 _950474 |
|
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6 |
| 912 | _aZDB-2-ENG | ||
| 912 | _aZDB-2-SXE | ||
| 942 | _cEBK | ||
| 999 |
_c78598 _d78598 |
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