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020 _a9783319758718
_9978-3-319-75871-8
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8
_2doi
050 4 _aTK5101-5105.9
072 7 _aTJK
_2bicssc
072 7 _aTEC041000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aTJK
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082 0 4 _a621.382
_223
100 1 _aHe, Xiaofan.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_951739
245 1 0 _aDynamic Games for Network Security
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai.
250 _a1st ed. 2018.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2018.
300 _aX, 74 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering,
_x2191-8120
520 _aThe goal of this SpringerBrief is to collect and systematically present the state-of-the-art in this research field and the underlying game-theoretic and learning tools to the broader audience with general network security and engineering backgrounds. Particularly, the exposition of this book begins with a brief introduction of relevant background knowledge in Chapter 1, followed by a review of existing applications of SG in addressing various dynamic network security problems in Chapter 2. A detailed treatment of dynamic security games with information asymmetry is given in Chapters 3–5. Specifically, dynamic security games with extra information that concerns security competitions, where the defender has an informational advantage over the adversary are discussed in Chapter 3. The complementary scenarios where the defender lacks information about the adversary is examined in Chapter 4 through the lens of incomplete information SG. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of how to proactively create information asymmetry for the defender’s benefit. The primary audience for this brief includes network engineers interested in security decision-making in dynamic network security problems. Researchers interested in the state-of-the-art research on stochastic game theory and its applications in network security will be interested in this SpringerBrief as well. Also graduate and undergraduate students interested in obtaining comprehensive information on stochastic game theory and applying it to address relevant research problems can use this SpringerBrief as a study guide. Lastly, concluding remarks and our perspective for future works are presented in Chapter 6.
650 0 _aTelecommunication.
_910437
650 0 _aData protection.
_97245
650 1 4 _aCommunications Engineering, Networks.
_931570
650 2 4 _aData and Information Security.
_931990
700 1 _aDai, Huaiyu.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_951740
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_951741
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319758701
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319758725
830 0 _aSpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering,
_x2191-8120
_951742
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8
912 _aZDB-2-ENG
912 _aZDB-2-SXE
942 _cEBK
999 _c78826
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