000 04236nam a22005655i 4500
001 978-3-031-02121-3
003 DE-He213
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007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 220601s2019 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783031021213
_9978-3-031-02121-3
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-02121-3
_2doi
050 4 _aQA1-939
072 7 _aPB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aMAT000000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aPB
_2thema
082 0 4 _a510
_223
100 1 _aGreenwood, Garrison W.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_980608
245 1 0 _aOn the Study of Human Cooperation via Computer Simulation
_h[electronic resource] :
_bWhy Existing Computer Models Fail to Tell Us Much of Anything /
_cby Garrison W. Greenwood.
250 _a1st ed. 2019.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2019.
300 _aXIV, 80 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthesis Lectures on Games and Computational Intelligence,
_x2573-6493
505 0 _aPreface -- Acknowledgments -- Social Dilemmas -- Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Social Dilemma Games -- Spatial and Network Games -- The Case Against Weak Selection -- The Moran Process and Replicator Dynamics -- The Problems with Computer Models -- The Path Forward -- Bibliography -- Author's Biography -- Index.
520 _aCooperation is pervasive throughout nature, but its origin remains an open question. For decades, social scientists, business leaders, and economists have struggled with an important question: why is cooperation so ubiquitous among unrelated humans? The answers would have profound effects because anything that promotes cooperation leads to more productive work environments and benefits society at large. Game theory provides an ideal framework for studying social dilemmas, or those situations in which people decide whether to cooperate with others (benefitting the group) or defect by prioritizing their self-interest (benefitting only the individual). The social dilemma is formulated as a mathematical game and then programmed into a computer model. Simulating the game allows researchers to investigate potential theories to explain how cooperation emerges and what promotes its persistence. Over the past 25 years, countless papers on social dilemma games have been published, yet arguably little progress has been made. The problem is the social dilemma game models are unrealistic in the sense they contain artificial constructs that deviate from the way humans act. This book describes the shortcomings in current social dilemma game modeling techniques and provides guidance on designing more effective models. A basic introduction to game theory is provided with an emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma, the most widely studied social dilemma game. Individual chapters are provided detailing the shortcomings of weak selection, spatial games, and the Moran process. Computer model validation is also discussed at length. The recommendations found in this book should help design more realistic social dilemma game models likely to produce a better understanding of human cooperation.
650 0 _aMathematics.
_911584
650 0 _aEngineering.
_99405
650 0 _aComputational intelligence.
_97716
650 0 _aPopular Culture.
_978660
650 0 _aArtificial intelligence.
_93407
650 1 4 _aMathematics.
_911584
650 2 4 _aTechnology and Engineering.
_980609
650 2 4 _aComputational Intelligence.
_97716
650 2 4 _aPopular Culture.
_978660
650 2 4 _aArtificial Intelligence.
_93407
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_980610
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031001703
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031009938
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031032493
830 0 _aSynthesis Lectures on Games and Computational Intelligence,
_x2573-6493
_980611
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02121-3
912 _aZDB-2-SXSC
942 _cEBK
999 _c84994
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