000 04057nam a22005535i 4500
001 978-3-031-79248-9
003 DE-He213
005 20240730164021.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 220601s2011 sz | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783031792489
_9978-3-031-79248-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-031-79248-9
_2doi
050 4 _aQ334-342
050 4 _aTA347.A78
072 7 _aUYQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM004000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aUYQ
_2thema
082 0 4 _a006.3
_223
100 1 _aOzdaglar, Asu.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_981684
245 1 0 _aNetwork Games
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Asu Ozdaglar, Ishai Menache.
250 _a1st ed. 2011.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2011.
300 _aXV, 143 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSynthesis Lectures on Learning, Networks, and Algorithms,
_x2690-4314
505 0 _aStatic Games and Solution Concepts -- Game Theory Dynamics -- Wireline Network Games -- Wireless Network Games -- Future Perspectives.
520 _aTraditional network optimization focuses on a single control objective in a network populated by obedient users and limited dispersion of information. However, most of today's networks are large-scale with lack of access to centralized information, consist of users with diverse requirements, and are subject to dynamic changes. These factors naturally motivate a new distributed control paradigm, where the network infrastructure is kept simple and the network control functions are delegated to individual agents which make their decisions independently ("selfishly"). The interaction of multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game theory, including economic notions related to markets and incentives. This monograph studies game theoretic models of resource allocation among selfish agents in networks. The first part of the monograph introduces fundamental game theoretic topics. Emphasis is given to the analysis of dynamics in game theoretic situations, which is crucial for design and control of networked systems. The second part of the monograph applies the game theoretic tools for the analysis of resource allocation in communication networks. We set up a general model of routing in wireline networks, emphasizing the congestion problems caused by delay and packet loss. In particular, we develop a systematic approach to characterizing the inefficiencies of network equilibria, and highlight the effect of autonomous service providers on network performance. We then turn to examining distributed power control in wireless networks. We show that the resulting Nash equilibria can be efficient if the degree of freedom given to end-users is properly designed. Table of Contents: Static Games and Solution Concepts / Game Theory Dynamics / Wireline Network Games / Wireless Network Games / Future Perspectives.
650 0 _aArtificial intelligence.
_93407
650 0 _aCooperating objects (Computer systems).
_96195
650 0 _aProgramming languages (Electronic computers).
_97503
650 0 _aTelecommunication.
_910437
650 1 4 _aArtificial Intelligence.
_93407
650 2 4 _aCyber-Physical Systems.
_932475
650 2 4 _aProgramming Language.
_939403
650 2 4 _aCommunications Engineering, Networks.
_931570
700 1 _aMenache, Ishai.
_eauthor.
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
_981685
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
_981686
773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031792472
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783031792496
830 0 _aSynthesis Lectures on Learning, Networks, and Algorithms,
_x2690-4314
_981687
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-79248-9
912 _aZDB-2-SXSC
942 _cEBK
999 _c85223
_d85223