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020 _a9783642161704
_9978-3-642-16170-4
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
_2doi
050 4 _aQA76.9.C65
072 7 _aUYM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aCOM072000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aUYM
_2thema
082 0 4 _a003.3
_223
245 1 0 _aAlgorithmic Game Theory
_h[electronic resource] :
_bThird International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings /
_cedited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis.
250 _a1st ed. 2010.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2010.
300 _aVIII, 359 p. 25 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aInformation Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,
_x2946-1642 ;
_v6386
505 0 _aWhen the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess's Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.
650 0 _aComputer simulation.
_95106
650 0 _aElectronic commerce.
_95589
650 0 _aComputer science.
_99832
650 0 _aComputers and civilization.
_921733
650 0 _aNumerical analysis.
_94603
650 1 4 _aComputer Modelling.
_9125665
650 2 4 _ae-Commerce and e-Business.
_931772
650 2 4 _aTheory of Computation.
_9125666
650 2 4 _aModels of Computation.
_931806
650 2 4 _aComputers and Society.
_931668
650 2 4 _aNumerical Analysis.
_94603
700 1 _aKontogiannis, Spyros.
_eeditor.
_4edt
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
_9125667
700 1 _aKoutsoupias, Elias.
_eeditor.
_4edt
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
_9125668
700 1 _aSpirakis, Paul.
_eeditor.
_4edt
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710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
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773 0 _tSpringer Nature eBook
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642161698
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642161711
830 0 _aInformation Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI,
_x2946-1642 ;
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_9125671
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
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